

STAGING DISAGREEMENT AND ITS ETHICS: A RANCIÈRIAN APPROACH TO
LANTHIMOS' *DOGTOOTH*

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'Ethics' is a tricky word. It is a much-discussed concept by scholars and non-scholars; yet, to comprehend the very meaning of ethics seems challenging. This is, perhaps, what makes the word ethics an attractive one. We often encounter the interchangeable use of ethics with morality; what is at stake with the word ethics is this ambiguity. If ethics is viewed as an indistinguishable term from morality, it generally falls into a field of normativity in which one's actions are obliged to align with certain judgements and principles. Such view of ethics, in other words, depicts a sphere in which judgements of morality reign over one's actions. Ethics, in this sense, simultaneously attempts to determine the limits of validity of these actions and justify the validity of these limits. Contrary to this widely accepted understanding, ethics implies a potentiality to disagree with the limits of validity of actions and question the validity of these limits at the same time. Ethics, in this way, exceeds morality; it is even capable of supplementing morality.

It would be valuable to turn back to the Ancient root of the word ethics, namely *ethos*, as it marks the overlap between the way in which one inhabits the world and one's attitude towards life in which the self, the other and the world are reciprocally related. *Ethos* does not solely offer an individual point of view towards life; rather, it offers an individuality that is positioned in a dynamic and involute map of relationships. In contemporary discussion of ethics, the word *ethos* seems appealing in order to free ethics from a certain set of moral principles and judgements. *Ethos* indeed characterizes a way of life that constantly and incessantly transgresses itself. It does not solely distinguish the validity of actions with respect to certain categories of morality; instead, it is the very ability to reflect on the limit that separates the valid and the invalid. *Ethos*, in this sense, creates a paradoxical scene in which the subject of *ethos* is both the one who experiences these limits and has the potential to transform them. It is this paradoxical movement of thinking that invites us to an infinite way of being.

If ethics is understood in this way, this question should be raised: Is there any generative principle that leads the subject of *ethos* to an infinite way of being? If there is, what would be this principle? We suggest Jacques Rancière's principle of equality as a potential answer to this question. To elaborate the principle of equality as an ethical principle is a demanding task since Rancière, in most of his works, discusses this principle implicitly as an ethical one, but explicitly as an aesthetico-political one. To put it differently, whereas the principle of equality is the very principle that leads Rancière to discuss aesthetics and politics prior to ethics, our primary focus is to reveal the ethics of this principle. The best strategy would be to carefully derive the ethical ground from his aesthetics and politics; this

could be considered as an attempt to make what is implicit explicit. We, therefore, offer a movement that is oriented towards ethics by concentrating on Rancière's central conception, namely *disagreement*. This also requires elucidating the scene of disagreement within its organic structure mainly comprising the act of the policing, politics and the distribution of the sensible.¹

Within this structure, Rancière meticulously conceptualizes politics not as a form of consensus, but as a form of disagreement or dissensus. He persistently distinguishes the policing from politics to reveal the wrongness of consensus-based politics, which is widely recognized by a set of procedures including arrangements of relationships between the state and its citizens through law. The wrong is, in the very ordering of the police, the production of a part that has no part. In other words, the wrong is the functioning of the police order in which "whoever is nameless cannot speak" for the good of society.² Politics, in this regard, is a handling of this wrong by the part that has no part. It is, as a problem, the enunciation of a gap between those who are capable of speaking for the good of society and those who are allegedly incapable of speaking.

Here, the distribution of the sensible operates as a concept to depict the sensible experiences of those who are assigned to certain functions, roles and places as well as to trace possible changes in the sensible experiences of those who are mis-functioned and mis-placed within the police order. To avoid from confusion, it should be noted that the distribution of the sensible does not imply the maintenance of the sensible order, but fundamentally a rethink of the impossibilities and the possibilities of the sensible order. To investigate ways of converting what is impossible into what is possible within the police is the main drama, which sets a stage for politics as the scene of disagreement. What accompanies scenes of disagreement is the principle of equality, which signifies equality between each and every speaking being; it is the principle that corresponds to the presupposition of equality that animates both the police and politics. By taking the principle of equality into the centre of our argument, just as Rancière does, we suggest that ethics is the core of his aesthetico-political framework since both the police and politics are dependent upon this principle. Therefore, in the first section, we elaborate respectively the police as an organisation through which the ethical dimension of relationships is delimited and politics as scenes of disagreement in which the ethical dimension of relationships becomes unlimited. This is because politics is an ethical act that opens the undoing of the police order to an infinite number of ethical responses. We name this the *ethics of equality*.³

Ethics as a major branch of philosophy has been discussed through films from diverse perspectives. For instance, focusing specifically on care ethics, Joseph H. Kupfer indicates that it is possible to convey and reconfigure fundamental values in the ethics of care through a film's narrative.⁴ David Martin-Jones, moreover, looks at "how we understand the ethical relations that are created in cinematic encounters" through Enrique Dussel's transmodern ethics.⁵ While these authors aiming to supplement philosophical discussions through cinema, their accounts on ethics are deprived of its relations to politics and aesthetics. The intricate relationship between ethics, aesthetics and politics in or through cinema, on the other hand, has been addressed broadly by some other film-philosophy

scholars. In this regard, for James S. Williams, cinema has a capacity to represent “an ethical dilemma connecting the work, author, character, spectator, and screen through different forms and modalities of subjectivity.”⁶ In order to demonstrate how ethics, aesthetics and politics are connected to each other in Jean-Luc Godard’s cinema, he accordingly argues that the director has an ethical intention while representing the other in his film as he tries not to subordinate the other within the film’s aesthetic parameters.⁷ Similar to Williams in terms of revealing ethics-aesthetics-politics relation, Robert Sinnerbrink proposes a concept of “cinematic ethics” through which he demonstrates cinema’s potential “to evoke ethical experience and invite philosophical reflection.”⁸

Our way of addressing the question of ethics in relation to aesthetics and politics is slightly different from the existing literature. First, while connecting the question of ethics with politics and aesthetics, we refer to what Rancière calls *the primary aesthetics* rather than to the aesthetics of the film which looks at how films “communicate ethical meaning via aesthetic means.”⁹ That is why it is important to distinguish between what Rancière calls *the aesthetics of politics* and *the politics of aesthetics* for the sake of our attempt. On the one hand, the aesthetics of politics designates a certain commonality in which the sensible forms of experiences are distributed and/or re-distributed. On the other hand, the politics of aesthetics designates artistic practices that, in Rancière’s words, “suspend the ordinary coordinates of sensory experience and reframe the network of relationships between spaces and times, subjects and objects, the common and the singular.”¹⁰ The former is also what Rancière calls the “primary aesthetics”, which also reveals the possibility of artistic practices within the general order of sensory experience.¹¹ For the latter, he also notes that “artistic practices are ‘ways of doing and making’ that intervene in the general distribution of ways of doing and making as well as in the relationships they maintain to modes of being and forms of visibility.”¹² Thus, the politics of aesthetics deals with the question of artistic practices, which may pave the way for an alteration within the general sensible order.¹³ What enables such artistic practices is the primary aesthetics as the sensible order which contains its own aesthetic forms, distributions and (im)possibilities of redistributions, namely the aesthetic of politics. Since our prior motivation is to examine the aesthetics of politics in relation to ethics, this can be renamed as the *ethico-aesthetics of politics*.

Secondly, while discussing Rancière’s ethics of equality through cinema, our investigation does not ground itself in the relation between film and spectators. This does not necessarily mean that we ignore the ethical and political interaction between film and spectators; however, to focus on this interaction requires examining how a film as an artwork deploys a certain politics via its aesthetics; what Rancière calls the politics of aesthetics. In other words, a film might carry the potential to bring counter-aesthetical forms of politics, which foresee a reconfiguration within the sensible order. Yet, to check the effectivity of films in this regard is dependent upon the primary aesthetics. Also, it must be noted that the interaction between film and spectators may lead to infinitely many forms of dissensus depending on different subjectivities that are shaped by various cultures, geographies, histories and so on. To examine a certain film with its politics of aesthetics would be nothing but the delimitation or

reduction of its political potentiality since each reception by spectators is unique. However, it is not impossible to depict general dynamics of the relationship between film and spectators in regard to the ethico-political potential of an artwork.¹⁴ Rancière indeed shows the way in which how the politics of aesthetics could infinitely proliferate itself depending on each singular encounter.

Hence, the value we see in such explication of Rancière's framework in relation to cinema does not lie on the investigation of either the aesthetics of film, or audience reception, or the *auteur*-ship. We are, instead, concerned with a special mode of thinking in which philosophy and film are mutually responsive to each other. Specifically, we aim to enrich the discussion on the ethico-aesthetics of politics through a reading of *Dogtooth/Kynodontas* (2009) as well as to provide a unique appraisal of the film. We selected *Dogtooth* – a film co-scripted (with Efthymis Filippou) and directed by Yorgos Lanthimos which tells the story of a family consisting of middle-aged parents of three adult-looking, home-schooled children, living in an isolated house with a private garden and a swimming pool somewhere in the countryside – as its narrative provides an exemplary setting to enrich the discussion of the ethics of equality. To argue this, we initially provide a critical analysis of the familial organization in *Dogtooth*, specifically focusing on how the family structurally resembles the police order and how the scenes of agreement and disagreement are displayed within this structure.¹⁵ We then demonstrate how the ethical and aesthetico-political value of the film lies on its capacity to narrate scenes of disagreement, especially in a pre-political sense.

THE ETHICS OF EQUALITY

To understand why Rancière discusses politics and aesthetics by prioritizing (in)equality, it is perhaps meaningful to mention his critique of Louis Althusser. In his early career, Rancière was a student of Althusser who is one of preeminent figures of Marxist theory and politics in French philosophy. After some time working in line with the Althusserian project, Rancière denounced it by indicating that it is grounded on the logic of inequality instead of equality. In the book titled *Althusser's Lessons*, Rancière declares a war against “the theory of the inequality of intelligences at the heart of supposed critiques of domination”; instead, he radically suggests that “all revolutionary thought must be founded on the inverse presupposition [the equality of intelligences], that of the capacity of the dominated.”¹⁶ The very foundation of Rancière's opposition to the Althusserian project lies on the division between intellectuals who are supposed to produce theory, as they are the ones capable of struggling with “the ‘complexity’ of history”, and workers who are responsible for production within “the ‘simplicity’ of nature.”¹⁷ It is, consequently, the logic of inequality that overlooks the intelligence of workers by presuming that “workers need our [intellectuals'] science” to revolt against their existing conditions.¹⁸ This initial critique of Rancière is what leads him to develop his own method, which he later names “the method of equality”, based on the principle of equality between any and every intelligences or speaking beings.

The principle of equality, as a primary principle of politics in Rancière's framework, has a dual role. On the one side, it enables us to understand the inauthentic form of politics, which generates consensus-oriented elements of politics such as state, bureaucracy, citizen, elections and so on. On the other side, it paves the way for the authentic form of politics, which generates dissenting scenes within the consensus-oriented politics. Rancière calls the former the police and the latter politics. Whereas the police is the organization in which the principle of equality turns into a non-egalitarian logic, politics is a stage where the principle of equality gives rise to an egalitarian logic by confronting it with the non-egalitarian one. To understand this, we need to take a closer look at how the principle of equality operates in the police and political processes.

The police, for Rancière, is a special process that must be distinguished from politics though majority of people consider politics as “the set of procedures whereby aggregation and consent of collectivities is achieved, the organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the systems for legitimizing this distribution.”¹⁹ Rancière emphasises that what the majority think of politics is actually the police. This, at the same time, requires rethinking the police differently than the state apparatus, for instance, which disciplines society in order to maintain it secure. The police, rather, is essentially the law of an order that assigns bodies to certain functions, roles and places through which it configures the sensible boundaries between what is sayable/unsayable, visible/invisible, audible/inaudible and ultimately possible/impossible.²⁰ What enables the police to set these boundaries is the principle of equality. Rancière appeals to the practice of obeying an order to explain how the principle of equality functions in the formation of the police:

There is order in society because some people command and others obey, but in order to obey an order at least two things are required: you must understand the order and you must understand that you must obey it. And to do that, you must already be the equal of the person who is ordering you. It is this equality that gnaws away at any natural order.²¹

At the heart of obeying an order, there is the equality of intelligences, which is prior to the police order or makes possible the policing. The police, in other words, is an organization in which “inequality is only possible through [the principle of] equality.”²² The equality of intelligences is the irreducible equality of speaking beings, which is later converted into the non-egalitarian logic once the police is established. This irreducible principle is what allows us to elucidate an ethical dimension of Rancièrean framework in which subjects of the police are not yet subjects, but equally intelligent speaking bodies before being subjected to a certain order.

What is wrong in being subjected to the police in relation to ethics? The wrong is the conversion of the initial equality of speaking beings into the logic of inequality at the expense of establishing the police. The wrong is the production of the part that has no part within the police order as if there are people who are less equal than others who are privileged. The police fundamentally does not deny

equality but, as Rancière points out, “*wrongs* equality” and damages the ethical.²³ Hence, what the policing seeks is consensus on the proposed order so as to homogenize the places of its subjects as if they were equal. This is, in a sense, an attempt to cover its wrong; this is ultimately what annihilates the possibility of the ethical within the order by tying subjects to a certain set of regulative values, allegedly ethical or moral values. Rancière addresses this ethical problem within the police as follows:

[Consensus] implies positing an immediate identity between the political constitution of the community [*demos*] and the physical and moral constitution of a population. Consensus describes the community as an entity that is naturally unified by ethical values. [However] *ethos*, we know, means 'dwelling' and 'way of being' before it refers to domain of moral values.²⁴

The police conceives *demos* as *one* entity within both its physical – or *spatio-temporal* – and moral configurations by the methodical abuse of the principle of equality. This is the way in which the police deals with the threat of an *excessive-one*, or in Rancière’s saying *one more*, “which confuses the right ordering of [the police].”²⁵

As opposed to such methodical abuse, politics is the stage in which the use of the principle of equality is performed by those who have no parts to undo the wrong. The political occurs when the part that has no part marks himself/herself as a subject of miscount, misnomer or misplacement within the police. Engagement with a certain distribution of roles, functions and places, even if it produces misrepresentations, depicts the distribution of sensible experiences within the police. The police, in essence, is a distribution of the sensible which is “a generally implicit law that defines the forms of partaking by first defining the modes of perception in which they are inscribed.”²⁶ Politics, on the other hand, is what breaks and disturbs the organization that is arranged by the parts of *demos* who are privileged with the status of speaking for others. Equivalently, it is a breach of the configuration of the sensible. What accompanies these moments of rupture is the principle of equality “between any and every speaking being.”²⁷ Politics is, in a sense, the interruption of the continuous validity of words belonging to the privileged ones who distribute the sensible order. Yet, politics cannot be comprehended solely on the ground of the rupture that initiates the process of equality, as the rupture is what sets a stage for a renewal of the police’s sensible distribution. Politics, then, is also the stage in which the field of sensible experiences of subjects is redistributed, reorganized or reconfigured. It requires the staging of dissenting words with the words of the police; it necessitates the staging of disagreement that results in the spectacle where the police logic and the egalitarian logic confront each other.²⁸ Politics, therefore, is fundamentally dependent upon the distribution of the sensible in which the principle of equality is always and already at play.²⁹

Concerning ethics, politics signifies that the damage to the ethical, which has been done by the police, can be suspended. This is because political subjectivization is about becoming the one who relentlessly demands to be equal to those who speak for the sake of the police. What describes this

process of equality as a political subjectivization, accordingly, is the correction of the wrong by supplementing the police with the words of those who have no part. Putting it differently, there is an interposition of the words of the police and the words of those who have no part within the police. The political subject, therefore, is a subject who enunciates his/her misplacement by assuming that his/her poetic capacity is equal to that of the privileged. It is to confirm politics as an activity, which “turns on equality as its principle.”³⁰ Politics, in this sense, is a revival of the principle of equality that was once forced by the police to be forgotten; nonetheless, this desire of the police is a paradoxical one since equality also lies in its very foundation. The method of equality as “the enactment of equality – or the handling of a wrong” is revivification of a certain kind of ethics at the stage of politics, namely the ethics of equality.³¹ The stage of disagreement, consequently, hosts political subjects who are simultaneously ethical.

Politics, for Rancière, is pregnant with multiple scenes of disagreement. As opposed to consensus-oriented politics, dissensual politics provides a stage in which the heterogenous logic of politics is revealed by the meeting of the police logic and the egalitarian logic. Politics is the staging of dis-homogeneity as long as the political subject performs a dissensual subjectivization, which signifies the very ability to enunciate a problem without the consent of the police. Where the police marks the archaic by constantly appealing to the hierarchy that comes with the distribution of places, the political subject marks that “politics has no arche, it is anarchical.”³² Consensus, on the one hand, is a way of maintaining of the positions designated by those who are privileged to speak and who give consent to others to speak. Dissensus, on the other hand, is what breaches this consensus by appealing to nothing but the principle of equality, which at the same time establishes the police order. Politics, thus, emphasises that even the police is a non-archaic organization despite its archaic claims. Correspondingly, there is a double paradox. The first one can be called the paradox of the police which is the act of ordering by the principle of equality that later turns into the non-egalitarian logic; the second one can be called the political paradox of bodies in which the bodies experience equality by suspending and supplementing the words of the police while they are also the subjects of inequality caused by these words. As Rancière puts it, “political subjectification is an ability to produce these polemical scenes, these paradoxical scenes, that bring out the contradiction between two logics, by positing existences that are at the same time nonexistences-or nonexistences that are at the same time existences.”³³ In other words, politics contends that what is invisible is actually visible, what is unsayable is actually sayable, what is inaudible is actually audible, and ultimately what is impossible is actually possible within the sensible order of the police. What makes the staging of disagreement spectacular is this ongoing paradoxical drama between the police logic and the egalitarian logic that leads to a production of subjects who have previously not existed or been named within the spatio-temporal organization of the police.

Then, the ethics of staging disagreement is embedded in the principle of equality. As long as every dissensual scene verifies and demonstrates equality, as Rancière noted, this contributes “to the

framing of new fabric common experience or a new common sense, upon which new forms of political subjectivization can be implemented.”³⁴ As politics operates with this ethical principle, it leads to a transformation in the sensible experiences of the bodies in desired forms. Correspondingly, what Rancière offers is actually the nexus of aesthetics, politics and ethics. Yet, we would like to emphasise the priority of the principle of equality as the principle of the distribution of the sensible. The conception of the distribution of the sensible is what allows us to trace the political on the stage. The dual implication of the concept as both the initial distribution of the police order and its redistribution through politics is what makes the inequality visible, audible and sayable such that the counter-transformation of inequality into equality becomes ethically, politically and aesthetically reified. The ethics of equality offers an ethical perspective in which ethics, politics and aesthetics are inseparable from each other. It is not the ethics dealing with deciding the validity limits of actions and justifying their validity with respect to a certain order, but the ethics dealing with the limits that wrongly confine the subject into a particular way of being. Ethics, in this sense, cannot be a set of values, mostly called morality, that regulates the very sensible experiences of subjects; it is, rather, a field in which the subjects of a miscalculation, misplacement or misrepresentation within the order designate new places and representations to themselves by both transgressively imagining and shaping themselves differently than the way they are.

THE STAGE OF DISAGREEMENT IN DOGTOOTH

Dogtooth has been well received in the world cinema especially after being awarded the *Un Certain Regard* award at *Cannes Film Festival* in 2009. Accordingly, the film has attracted a considerable attention in the field of film studies due to its unique aesthetic characteristics, the absurd and violent elements in its narrative as well as its critical approach to the notion of family. Rosalind Galt, for example, explores the crucial narrative role animals play in *Dogtooth*, whereas Angelos Koutsourakis looks at how Lanthimos reduces the narrative of *Dogtooth* to the bodies of the actors.³⁵ Most of the literature on *Dogtooth*, however, suggests an analysis of the film in relation to the (socio)economic crisis of that time in Greece and the crisis of contemporary Western society more generally by referring to *Dogtooth* as an example of *Greek Weird Wave*.³⁶ Stamos Metzidakis argues that *Dogtooth* cannot be analysed without examining “contemporary Greek familial culture” and how this is linked to (socio)economic crisis.³⁷ Alex Lykidis demonstrates how the political and economic crises are symbolically represented in the family’s quasi-bureaucratic structure where the father as an authoritative figure exercises methods of governance over other family members.³⁸ From a slightly different perspective, Ipek Celik examines the family in *Dogtooth* “as an allegory to internal borders in and of Greece, and in extension those in and of Europe” to discuss contemporary migrant crises.³⁹ Tatjana Aleksic’s approach, on the other hand, is notably different from previous ones as she avoids the contextualisation of *Dogtooth* in line with the crisis narrative. Aleksic suggests an analysis of “the

modalities of violence” within the family through *Dogtooth* and *Miss Violence* by not reducing the inner dynamics of violence into the historico-political and economic crises in Greece as if these are the sole reason for oppressive familial practices.⁴⁰ As Aleksic did, we also invite our readers to think about what is called family beyond the (socio)economic crisis narrative as these narratives would lead to the obscuring of fundamental principles that operate within the very logic of oppressive familial practices. Accordingly, what we attempt is not to situate or appropriate *Dogtooth* in the historico-political and economic context of Greek society at the time the film was released. In a sense, we avoid a sort of journalistic appropriation. Rather, we concentrate on the organization of what is called family in regard to ethics, aesthetics and politics in a Rancièrian way. The motivation behind such an attempt is not exclusively dependent upon our choice as there is neither a specific sign of the historical period to which the family belongs, nor a geographical verification of the location inhabited by the family.⁴¹ These aspects reveal the untimely character of *Dogtooth*. By not confining *Dogtooth* to a particular place and time, we aim to enrich the discussion of the notion of family; to do otherwise would miss the chance to meditate upon the resemblance between the *oikos* and the *polis* as well as the very functioning of these two.

Accordingly, the reason we chose Yorgos Lanthimos’ *Dogtooth* is its availability to show how the family structurally resembles the *police*. This idea comes from a common aphorism: the family is the basis of society. This saying can be traced back to Ancient Greece. In *The Eudemian Ethics*, Aristotle specifies two sorts of controlling arts. The first is “the art that controls all arts”: the art of politics which is the art of governing bodies of the *polis* or what Rancière criticises as the police order.⁴² The second sort of art is household management: the *oikos*.⁴³ The word *oikos* does not only refer to a house in its materiality, but also refers to the idea of the family and its inner regulations. Even though there is a hypothetical distinction between the *oikos* and the *polis* depending on the facts that the house is a more private and controllable space with respect to the city and the city is the idealized form of the *oikos*, the distinction between them is vague. This is because the *oikos* and the *polis* are constantly in a mutual relationship as what constitutes the city is the merging of various representations of houses. In other words, ‘the political man’ is a ‘man’ who simultaneously orders his house and the city with other householders. It is, therefore, hard to describe where the limits of the *oikos* end and where the limits of the *polis* begin and vice versa. They are rather involute processes that seem compatible with each other in terms of a certain configuration of the sensible experiences of bodies. Even though the presumption of the *polis* is that it is an idealized form of the *oikos*, *Dogtooth* reverses this presumption in that the *oikos* is the space that can be an idealized form of the *polis* by the regulations of the householder. In *Dogtooth*, the father [Christos Stergioglou], who has an exceptional status to distribute certain roles, functions and places to the other family members, sets a stage to analyse the *oikos* as a form of the *polis*.

The idea of staging, as an inherent characteristic of politics, is not just about politics as scenes of disagreement but also the act of policing as scenes of agreement about a certain distribution of the

sensible. What *Dogtooth* firstly accomplishes is the presentation of scenes of the police order by specifically focusing on the organization of the family. The film, in a radical sense, provides a certain vocabulary, spatio-temporal boundaries of the house, a certain set of moral values and so on. Even this initial description of *Dogtooth* is capable of triggering a discussion of the act of policing by promoting the *oikos* as an alternative of the *polis*. Yet, this substitution of the *polis* with the *oikos* is not a utopia as the father's act of policing overrides his intentions of protecting his family from the city and its perversion.

Lanthimos opens the film with a scene where the children are listening to a tape to learn new words and the meanings of those words. The interesting thing is that the words defined on the record are absolutely different from what they actually mean. The word sea, for instance, is defined as “a leather armchair with wooden arms like the one we have in our living room.”⁴⁴ In the similar way, the other words motorway, excursion and carbine are defined. These words are circulated in the *oikos* under the control of the parents. Throughout the film, we also hear other words that are put into circulation without the consent of the parents. These words are the words that the children unexpectedly learn like the words pussy and zombie. However, regardless of whether the word is presented under the father's control, all words are explained by staying within the sensible limits of the house. The word pussy, for this reason, is explained as “a big light” and the word zombie as “a small yellow flower.”⁴⁵ Why it is extremely important to be able to dominate the relations between words and things is in need of explanation.

As Rancière noted, “humans are political animals because they are literary animals: not only in the Aristotelian sense of using language in order to discuss questions of justice, but also we are confounded by the excess of words in relation to things.”⁴⁶ The literariness or the poetic capacity of humans is what leads to the staging of disagreement by the excess of words. The excess, here, refers to the limits that are imposed on us by the police order. The very definition of the police also implies certain regulations of the relation, in Rancière's saying, between “the visible and the sayable, [...] words and bodies.”⁴⁷ The police, depending on that, is the name of an organization that determines what the excessive words are by holding all relations between the visible and the sayable, and correspondingly words and bodies. In other words, the maintenance of the ordering of the police is dependent upon the act of controlling words in the circulation and its relations with things and bodies. Back to *Dogtooth*, it is noticeable that none of the family members have a specific name, except the names defining their roles within the *oikos* like the father, the mother [Michele Valley], the eldest [Angeliki Papoulia], the son [Hristos Passalis], and the younger daughter [Mary Tsoni]. The reason, of course, is open to speculation, but the clear thing is that these names assign bodies into certain functions or spatio-temporalities. Control over the relations between names and things, on the other hand, operates as a way of securing the order. For this reason, when one of the children asks for the meaning of a new word s/he heard, the mother's first reaction is to ask where s/he heard that word. This is because the excess of words is a threat that needs to be annihilated for the sake of the order.

The ongoing struggle of the parents with the excessive use of words is to reduce or alter their meanings in accordance with the existing configuration of the sensible. This functions as a way of blocking the outside as well as the excess.

Blocking the outside and the excess, in another aspect, unfolds what Rancière calls “the pedagogical myth” that “divides the world into two. More precisely, it divides intelligence into two. It says that there is an inferior intelligence and a superior one.”⁴⁸ Whereas the latter determines a regime of thinking, saying, seeing and doing as it “knows things by reason, proceeds by method”, the former is supposed to follow, retain and imitate what is proposed by the latter.⁴⁹ Rancière, in parallel to the non-egalitarian logic, names this “pedagogical stultification” which operates against the equality of intelligences that inherently refers to the equality of speaking beings as its axiom.⁵⁰ It is, in a sense, the pedagogical logic that methodically abuses the ethical principle of equality between any and every speaking being. As long as the children obey this logic, they are rewarded; if one of them somehow disturbs the very functioning of this logic, s/he is punished. This reward-punishment-based law of the order is what delimits the field of ethical responses by interchanging it with the set of rules defining the way in which the family members speak and live.

What abuses the ethical equality of poetic beings is also the set of rules that orders bodies spatio-temporally. As Rancière details in obeying an order, the method of inequality forces its subjects to forget the fact that the one who pronounces the law and the one who understands the law and obeys are equally intelligent. This is how the father in *Dogtooth* gains his exceptional, privileged and heroic status as the legislator of the *oikos*. He is the one who defines the spatio-temporal organization of the bodies; he is also the one who is capable of re-defining this organization as if the other members of family have no capacity to do it. Correspondingly, he is, on the one hand, the hero and the privileged who can drive, go outside the house, destroy the enemy-cat, hunt the fishes, punish/reward the children and so on; he is, on the other hand, the exception within the family as he decides what the children and the mother are supposed to do in which time of the day and in which space of the house, who can come into the house, who cannot leave the house, how each member of the family should behave according to the moral values, how they should be dressed at dinners and so on. All of these ultimately result in the distribution of the sensible experiences within the *oikos*. Putting it differently, all these acts determine the boundaries between the sayable/unsayable, the visible/invisible, the audible/inaudible and consequently the possible/impossible sensible experiences. It should be noted that these dualities are not rational contrasts; rather, they are depictions of what is possible and impossible to experience within the partition of the sensible by virtue of the poetic capacity of the father. The poetic capacity, here, designates the very regulation of the relations between words and the field of sensible experiences. It is the poetic capacity that wrongs the equality of poetic beings or speaking beings as it silences the other possible poetic relations within the sensible partition. The father is the poetic figure who constantly attempts to eliminate the possibility of counter-poetic

movements that might lead to a change within his predesignated relations between words and the sensible.



Figures 1-6: Screenshots from *Dogtooth* (© Yorgos Lanthimos).

The spatio-temporal organization of bodies cannot be separated from a certain aesthetics which refers both to the sensible experiences of bodies and the scenes of consensus with regard to these experiences. That is why the family gatherings, the celebration of certain dates like the wedding anniversary, the image of the heroic father after his so-called struggle with the enemy-cat, certain songs and dances while having fun and so on are integral parts of the act of ordering. These are the scenes of policing in which everyone acts as if they are in agreement with the ordering. What threatens these scenes of consensus is the excess as it evokes a way of living outside the boundaries of the *oikos*. Throughout the film, there are a few noticeable threats, even sometimes enemies, like the plane, the cat, the escapee brother, perhaps more importantly Christina [Anna Kalaitzidou] who is hired by the father to meet the son's sexual needs. The common characteristic of all threats is to lead to excessive speech and acts within the *oikos* since they are basically the outsiders. Even though the parents are persistent in maintaining the sensible order, we see that the order is always open to breaches. As long as there is a designation of a certain configuration of the sensible with words, the possibility to penetrate into those designations with the excessive use of words is always and already there.

In order to grasp better what essentially defines the *oikos* in *Dogtooth*, attention should be paid to this conversation between the father and the children at the dining table:

The Father : A child is ready to leave the house...

The Eldest : When the right dogtooth comes out.

The Father : Or the left. No matter.

Only then is your body ready to face the dangers that lurk.

To leave the house and be safe outside we must take the car.

When are we ready to learn to drive?

The Son : When the right dogtooth grows again. Or the left, it doesn't matter.⁵¹

These lines express the main configuration of what is possible and impossible within the *oikos*. We are witnessing the presentation of the impossibility as if it is a possibility inasmuch as the father knows the fact that the falling dogtooth of an adult cannot renew itself. These rules, therefore, are designed to ensure that the children cannot leave the house, which fundamentally shapes the way in which the children live. Even if these rules are based on a contradiction or a lie, it does not matter as long as the bodies that are subjected to these rules believe without questioning and behave accordingly. This is how consensus operates throughout the bodies and how the logic of inequality remains functioning. Inequality, as Rancière puts it, “works to the extent that one ‘believes’ it, that one goes on using one’s arms, eyes, and brains according to the distribution of the positions. This is what consensus means. And this is the way domination works.”⁵² The belief that entitles the film is that the children can only leave the house when the dogtooth comes out. Moreover, they can only leave the house by car, but they can learn how to drive once the dogtooth grows again. This is the doubling of the impossibility; yet, what the logic of consensus accomplishes is to make the children believe that both the falling and the renewal of the dogtooth are possible. This is how the logic of inequality dominates the field of perception and relations.

However, “dissensus starts with a new belief”; a new belief that imagines the field of perception other than the way it is.⁵³ We are following the initial signs of such an imagination with the eldest, especially after she gets copies of two films, *Rocky* (1976) and *Jaws* (1975), from Christina. She learns other uses of words that are unsayable and inaudible as well as other things that are invisible within the very order she inhabits. Perhaps most importantly, she notices that she even does not have a specific name. By the effect of the films, the eldest begins to disturb the spatio-temporal organization of the *oikos*. She performs acts differently than those she is supposed to perform by imitating the scenes in the films. Even though they are mimetic acts, the supplementation of the *oikos* with these acts presents genuine scenes. We are observing the eldest as someone who is not compatible with the spatio-temporal order. She is signifying herself as the part that has no part of the *oikos*, the part that has no proper name to regulate the order. One of noticeable scenes of *Dogtooth* is the one in which the eldest decides her own name as in the following dialogue:

The Eldest : I want you to call me Bruce.

The Younger Daughter : What is Bruce?

The Eldest : It is a name.

The Younger Daughter : I want a name like that too.⁵⁴

This is what Rancière calls *nonrelation* through which the relation between names and bodies is broken.⁵⁵ It is, in a sense, a breach of the continuity of the process in which names assign certain functions to bodies; it is the excessive use of words that jeopardizes the sensible configuration.

The excess is dependent upon the principle of equality as it confirms the equality between every poetic being. Such an understanding of ethics, as different from morality, is pregnant with infinite ways of being or a field of infinite responses towards what problematically delimits us. If ethics is shaped through the necessities of the police order, it always offers a set of values that determines the way in which bodies must act within the order. This is a delimitation of ethics, which eventually opens it to abuses of the police. It is, indeed, possible to observe different sets of moral values within different spatio-temporal orders. In *Dogtooth*, for instance, the father offers incest between the son and the eldest daughter as a solution after Christina became a dangerous outsider. As the very order of the *oikos* designates that a man has sexual needs, we are witnessing changes in the moral values depending on the necessities of the order, and correspondingly a lack of response to that situation. The scene of the eldest and the son after having obligatory sexual intercourse demonstrates that the set of words of the *oikos* is inadequate for the eldest to show how uncomfortable and annoyed she is; that is why she expresses her own feelings by the lines from the films. This is another moment of nonrelation we witness in *Dogtooth*. As Rancière puts it:

In politics, subjects do not have consistent bodies; they are fluctuating performers who have their moments, places, occurrences, and the peculiar role of inventing *arguments* and *demonstrations* – in the double, logical and aesthetic, senses of the terms – to bring the nonrelationship into relationship and give place to the nonplace.⁵⁶

What is expected from bodies in politics is performances that are inconsistent with the sensible configuration. It is the supplementary logic of politics that sets a stage in which bodies perform the unexpected and the unforeseen in the eyes of the order; it is, in other words, the stage of disagreement where bodies reject the roles assigned to them by demonstrating how the relations between names and things that structure their field of experiences could be broken.

In the last scenes of *Dogtooth*, the eldest, especially after naming herself Bruce, increases the frequency of moments of nonrelation. The following dialogue between the eldest and the younger daughter depicts how the eldest starts to imagine things other than the way they are:

The Eldest : I think my dogtooth is moving.

The Younger Daughter : You are imagining things. It is not moving at all.⁵⁷

The younger daughter is, indeed, right because the eldest is imagining even though she knows the bare fact that her dogtooth is not shaky. She, moreover, disturbs the very organization of the marriage anniversary by the peculiar way she dances and acts. The final and the impressive moment is where she breaks her own dogtooth. This, at first sight, may seem compatible with the rules of the *oikos*; nonetheless, it is a moment of breach as she actualizes the unexpected. In this sense, she signifies the paradox of the *oikos* that presents the impossibility of falling of a dogtooth as a possibility: Correspondingly, while she is following the dogtooth rule to leave the house, she transforms what is impossible into the possible.



Figures 7-8: Screenshots from *Dogtooth* (© Yorgos Lanthimos).

Yet, it is not possible to mention that there is politics in *Dogtooth*. Even though the eldest performs the pre-political by acting in line with the principle of equality that is excessive to the *oikos*, the consequence is not capable of producing more than the moments of nonrelation. What politics requires is, through the enunciation of a problem, the redistribution of the field of the sensible experiences by genuine demands of the subject that has no part within the order. Politics is the stage in which the nonrelation turns into a relation and the nonplace of the subject is transformed into a place. Hence, without these transformations or the redistribution of the sensible, politics is not achievable. Politics would have been achieved if the eldest had stayed within the *oikos* to supplement it with a process of equality. This is because “politics acts on the police. It acts in the places and with the words that are common to both, even if it means reshaping those places and changing the status of those words.”⁵⁸ However, this does not necessarily mean that *Dogtooth* fails to demonstrate ethical and aesthetico-political possibilities within the order, though the eldest misses the opportunity to redistribute the sensible by escaping from the *oikos* in the trunk of her father’s car.



Figure 9: A screenshot from *Dogtooth* (© Yorgos Lanthimos).

Dogtooth is capable of illustrating the pre-political, which can be considered as a demonstration of how policing functions and is open to breaches. *Dogtooth*, in this regard, signifies having the courage to initiate something incompatible with the order, something anachronistic with the spatio-temporal order or something that ruptures the very functioning of the organization without a pre-determined end. The last frame of *Dogtooth* (see figure 9), in a metaphorical sense, demonstrates the uncertainty of the political even in its initial stages. Consequently, we must shift our attention from the designation of certain ends for the political process to the moments that initiate it. The eldest is not the first who tries to disturb the *oikos* and to find a way out. We also know the escapee brother who initiates such a crisis without any achievement as the redistribution of the sensible order. To quote from Rancière:

[...] the slogan of 1968: ‘This is only the beginning, let’s continue the struggle.’ Beginnings do not reach their end. They remain halfway. But this also means that they never stop beginning over again, even if this means that the actors change.⁵⁹

The very ability to start over and over again is dependent upon the irreducible principle of ethics, namely the principle of equality. It is the principle that conceives ethics as the field where the infinite ways of being is possible. The main drama triggered by this principle in the ongoing struggle with any kind of policing is its very ability to interrupt the delimitations and to infinitize the responses against those delimitations afterwards. This is how the ethics of equality stages disagreement.

EPILOGUE

There were two major aims of this article. The first aim was to reveal Rancière’s principle of equality as the ethical principle that is embedded in his aesthetico-politics; the second was to demonstrate how this principle is depicted in *Dogtooth* in relation to Rancière’s framework. The initial step was consisted of a careful elaboration of how the equality of speaking beings as the irreducible principle of ethics is always and already at play within both the police process and the political process. The police, as the consensus-based form of politics, is the organization in which the principle of equality is reduced to the logic of inequality, as we called the methodical abuse of this principle. Politics, contrarily, is the process in which the methodical use of the principle of equality evokes dissensual subjectivizations within the police. It is, at the same time, an ethical process where the subjects that have no parts interrupt the order with their poetic capacities and supplement it with their dissenting words so as to gain a part. This is the ethical speech act being excessive to the police, which eventually results in the redistribution of the sensible. Hence, the ethics of equality generated by the principle of equality is the locus of Rancière’s aesthetics and politics of disagreement. The second step consisted of the analysis of *Dogtooth* in regard to the ethics of equality. By justifying the *oikos* as an

equivalent form of the *polis*, it is argued that the narrative of *Dogtooth* provides exemplary scenes of disagreement, especially in the pre-political sense. *Dogtooth* presents, on the one side, scenes of consensus with its designated relationships; on the other side, scenes of dissensus where the relations are turned into nonrelation to create new forms of relations. In *Dogtooth*, even though there is no staging of sensible transformation in the order, the presentation of such scenes is crucial to signify the political as a fundamental ability to initiate processes in which the sensible field might be reconfigured. What the ethics of equality offers is the constant capacity to initiate emancipatory processes as opposed to every sort of domination by the predetermined correspondence between *poiesis* and *aisthesis*. What makes *Dogtooth* both ethically and aesthetico-politically remarkable is the staging of such dominations and how they are always open to be breached.

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¹ Rancière's one of main conception *le partage du sensible* is translated into English mainly in two ways: *the partition of the sensible* and *the distribution of the sensible*. The reason is the polysemy carried by the word *partage*; *partage* means sharing, division and separation. All these meanings are referential to each other. On the one hand, the partition designates the way of distribution as the partition, in Latin *partitio*, determines the way things are divided, separated and shared. On the other hand, what is distributed designates the share and the division as to distribute, in Latin *distributus*, means to divide and to give out in portions. We, for this reason, do not hesitate to use both translations; yet, *the distribution of the sensible* is frequently used in this article.

² Jacques Rancière, *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy*, trans. Julie Rose (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 23.

³ We could prefer to use Rancière's own saying, *the method of equality*, instead of the *ethics of equality*; however, this could be less effective to signify the underlying ethics of Rancière's aesthetico-political framework. See Jacques Rancière, "The Method of Equality: Politics and Poetics", ed. Katia Genel and Jean-Philippe Deranty, *Recognition or Disagreement: A Critical Encounter on the Politics of Freedom, Equality, and Identity*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 133–55. Moreover, the usage of this phrase, the *ethics of equality*, is not exclusive to us. See for example, Todd May, "Jacques Rancière and the Ethics of Equality", *SubStance* 36, no. 113 (2007): 20–36. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25195123>.

⁴ Joseph Kupfer, *Feminist Ethics in Film: Reconfiguring Care through Cinema* (Bristol: Intellect, 2012), 120.

⁵ David Martin-Jones, "The Dardenne Brothers Encounter Enrique Dussel: Ethics, Eurocentrism and a Philosophy for World Cinemas", ed. M. Monteiro, G. Giucci, and N. Besner, *Beyond the Limits: Essays for the XXI Century*, (Rio de Janeiro: State University of Rio de Janeiro Press, 2013), 105; David Martin-Jones, "Trolls, Tigers and Transmodern Ecological Encounters: Enrique Dussel and a Cine Ethics for the Anthropocene", *Film-Philosophy* 20 (2016): 63–103.

⁶ James S. Williams, *Encounters with Godard: Ethics, Aesthetics, Politics* (New York: Suny Press, 2016), 10–11.

⁷ Williams, *Encounters with Godard*, 8.

⁸ Robert Sinnerbrink, *Cinematic Ethics: Exploring Ethical Experience through Film* (London and New York: Routledge, 2016), 3.

⁹ Sinnerbrink, *Cinematic Ethics*, 17.

¹⁰ Jacques Rancière, "The Politics of Aesthetics", *Mute*, September 2004, accessed October 12, 2019. <https://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/politics-aesthetics>.

¹¹ Jacques Rancière, *The Politics of Aesthetics*, ed. and trans. Gabriel Rockhill (London: Bloomsbury, 2019), 8.

¹² Rancière, *The Politics of Aesthetics*, 8.

¹³ Rancière, through the politics of aesthetics, problematizes the art practices as practices that would potentially impart different sensory experiences to our common sensory fields as if art is a call for dissensus for the reconfiguration of the sensible order. Accordingly, Rancière distinguishes three regimes of art where he meticulously questions certain approaches towards art: *the ethical regime*, *the representative regime* and *the aesthetic regime*. By this tripartite analysis, Rancière suggests considering cinema under a bipartite framework consisted of the representative regime and the aesthetic regime. To demonstrate distinctions between these regimes is not an attempt to define historical periods in which each regime reigns over creative practices in a strict sense; instead, it attempts to demonstrate how each regime and their principles stand in contrast to one another and ultimately shape the aesthetics of art practices. Accordingly, the representative regime exists in contrast to the ethical just as the aesthetic regime exists in contrast to the representative. Briefly, the ethical regime deals with the question of images in order to know the ways in which the *ethos* – the mode of being of individuals and communities – is influenced by images. In a confrontational way with the ethical regime, the representative regime deals with the regulation of visible forms within a community in order to construct an organization where words and representations, or namely *poiesis* and *mimesis (aisthesis)*, are appropriately corresponded. This is the regime at the service of the pre-designated order of the sensible in which certain roles, functions and places are distributed to individuals to form a community. Lastly, the aesthetics regime, contrary to the representative, is the regime in which the singularity of an artwork is radically freed from any pre-designated correspondences or principles. It is the regime where the radical singularity of art is most welcomed. Art, in this regime, is no longer bounded by a certain ordering of the sensible; rather, it suspends and supplements the existing order in unexpected ways. Thus, the aesthetic regime of art is profoundly connected with what Rancière calls the politics of aesthetics. See Rancière, *The Politics of Aesthetics*, 15–25.

¹⁴ For further discussion on the general dynamics of the relationship between film and spectators in compatible with Rancière's notion of the politics of aesthetics, see Tom Conley, "Cinema and Its Discontents: Jacques Rancière and Film Theory", *SubStance* 34, no. 108 (2005): 96–106; Duncan Chesney, 'Rancière, Deleuze and Contemporary Film Aesthetics', *New Review of Film and Television Studies* 8, no. 1 (2010): 22–40.

¹⁵ Considering the main setting of the film as a large house located in the countryside, we should note that Rancière also acknowledges the domestic sphere as a political space. This is not only because we see the operation of power relationships in the domestic sphere but also because there is a possibility of disagreement within the structure of family. Rancière, for instance, overbroadly argues the conversion of the domestic sphere into a political one by regarding the capacity and the role of women in the society; however, we propose that this can be extended in various ways such as parent – children relationships. See Rancière, *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy*, 32.

¹⁶ Jacques Rancière, *Althusser's Lessons*, trans. Emiliano Battista (London and New York: Continuum, 2011), xvi.

¹⁷ Rancière, *Althusser's Lessons*, 10.

¹⁸ Rancière, *Althusser's Lessons*, 12.

¹⁹ Rancière, *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy*, 28.

²⁰ Rancière, *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy*, 29.

²¹ Rancière, *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy*, 16.

²² Rancière, *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy*, 17.

²³ Jacques Rancière, "Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization", *October* 61 (1992): 59.

²⁴ Jacques Rancière, *Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics*, ed. and trans. Steven Corcoran (London and New York: Continuum, 2010), 100.

²⁵ Rancière, "Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization", 59.

²⁶ Rancière, *Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics*, 36.

²⁷ Rancière, *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy*, 30.

²⁸ Rancière, *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy*, 32.

²⁹ Rancière uses *the distribution of the sensible* to refer both the sensible order of the police and the re-ordering of the sensible as politics. In order to emphasise the re-ordering of politics, we shall use *the redistribution of the sensible* hereafter.

³⁰ Rancière, *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy*, ix.

³¹ Rancière, "Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization", 61.

³² Rancière, "Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization", 59.

³³ Rancière, *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy*, 41.

³⁴ Jacques Rancière, "Afterword/The Method of Equality: An Answer to Some Questions", ed. Gabriel Rockhill and Philip Watts, *Jacques Rancière: History, Politics, Aesthetics*, (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2009), 280.

³⁵ Rosalind Galt, “The Animal Logic of Contemporary Greek Cinema”, *Framework: The Journal of Cinema and Media* 58, no. 1–2 (2017): 7; Angelos Koutsourakis, “Cinema of the Body: The Politics of Performativity in Lars von Trier’s *Dogville* and Yorgos Lanthimos’ *Dogtooth*”, *Cinema: Journal of Philosophy and the Moving Image* 3 (2012): 84–108.

³⁶ Stamos Metzidakis refers to *Greek Weird Wave* in cinema “as an absurdist reaction to some of Greece’s most pressing contemporary socio-economic issues”. See Stamos Metzidakis, “No Bones to Pick with Lanthimos’s Film *Dogtooth*”, *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 32, no. 2 (2014): 368.

³⁷ Stamos Metzidakis, “No Bones to Pick with Lanthimos’s Film *Dogtooth*”, 368.

³⁸ Alex Lykidis, “Crisis of Sovereignty in Recent Greek Cinema”, *Journal of Greek Media & Culture* 1, no. 1 (2015): 11.

³⁹ Ipek A. Celik, “Family as Internal Border in *Dogtooth*”, in *Frontiers of Screen History: Imagining European Borders in Cinema, 1945–2010*, ed. Raita Merivirta et al. (Bristol: Intellect, 2013), 219.

⁴⁰ Tatjana Aleksic, “Sex, Violence, Dogs and the Impossibility of Escape: Why Contemporary Greek Film is so Focused on Family”, *Journal of Greek Media & Culture* 2, no. 2 (2016): 157.

⁴¹ If attention is paid to Yorgos Lanthimos’ interviews about *Dogtooth*, it is noticeable that his accounts are devoid of any specific connections between his film and a particular historical-political context. See, for example, David Jenkins, “Giorgos Lanthimos on “*Dogtooth*””, *Time Out London*, 2010, accessed October 12, 2019. <https://www.timeout.com/london/film/giorgos-lanthimos-on-dogtooth-1>; Michael Zelenko, “Rumpus Interview with Yorgos Lanthimos, Director of *Dogtooth*”, *The Rumpus*, June 2010, accessed October 12, 2019, <https://therumpus.net/2010/06/rumpus-interview-with-yorgos-lanthimos-director-of-dogtooth>; Sam Adams, “*Dogtooth* Director Giorgos Lanthimos”, *The A.V. Club*, June 2010, accessed October 12, 2019, <https://film.avclub.com/dogtooth-director-giorgos-lanthimos-1798220614>; Virginie Sélavy, “*Dogtooth*: Interview with Yorgos Lanthimos”, *Electric Sheep: A Deviant View of Cinema*, April 2010, accessed October 12, 2019, <http://www.electricsheepmagazine.co.uk/2010/04/05/dogtooth-interview-with-giorgos-lanthimos>.

⁴² Aristotle, *The Eudemian Ethics of Aristotle*, trans. Michael Woods (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2013), 19.

⁴³ Aristotle, *The Eudemian Ethics of Aristotle*, 19.

⁴⁴ Yorgos Lanthimos, “*Kynodontas/Dogtooth*”, filmed 2009, Greece, Boo Productions, video, 0:51, <https://itunes.apple.com/ie/movie/dogtooth/id375983430>.

⁴⁵ Lanthimos, *Dogtooth*, 55:45, 1:01:15.

⁴⁶ Jacques Rancière and Davide Panagia, “Dissenting Words: A Conversation of Jacques Rancière”, *Diacritics* 30, no. 2 (2000): 115.

⁴⁷ Rancière and Panagia, “Dissenting Words: A Conversation of Jacques Rancière”, 115.

⁴⁸ Jacques Rancière, *The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation*, trans. Kristin Ross (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1991), 7.

⁴⁹ Rancière, *The Ignorant Schoolmaster*, 7.

⁵⁰ Rancière, *The Ignorant Schoolmaster*, 9.

⁵¹ Lanthimos, *Dogtooth*, 55: 07.

⁵² Rancière, “The Method of Equality: Politics and Poetics”, 137.

⁵³ Rancière, “The Method of Equality: Politics and Poetics”, 141.

⁵⁴ Lanthimos, *Dogtooth*, 1:07:08.

⁵⁵ Jacques Rancière, *The Names of History: On the Poetics of Knowledge*, trans. Hassan Melehy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 34.

⁵⁶ Rancière, *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy*, 89.

⁵⁷ Lanthimos, *Dogtooth*, 1:18:23.

⁵⁸ Rancière, *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy*, 33.

⁵⁹ Jacques Rancière, “Jacques Rancière on the Gilets Jaunes Protests”, *Verso Books*, 12 February 2019, <https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/4237-jacques-ranciere-on-the-gilets-jaunes-protests>.